Green Infrastructure Investment in a Social-Hydrological Network

Precipitation from intense storm events can cause floods, wash away crops at vulnerable growth stages, and push distributed pollutants into waterways endangering ecosystems and water supplies. Because land use planning, waste water and drinking water treatment, and many conservation activities in the United States are substantially delegated to local government, protecting against storm water damage is a significant challenge for appointed and elected officials at the city, county, tribe, and special district level in Minnesota. The challenge is compounded by the fact that these local units of government often have jurisdictions that poorly match the shape of the hydrological system, which means the costs and benefits of storm water management are shared with upstream and downstream neighbors. Many intuitively understand that these externalities are important, but little work has been done to investigate the complex local budget incentives that arise from this complicated map.

To contribute to our understanding of storm water management, I use the tools of network analysis and game theory to analyze storm-water management as a form of public goods provision in Minnesota. I look at the kinds of conservation behavior we might expect from local governments making investments in green infrastructure while thinking about the behavior of their upstream and downstream neighbors. Specifically, I look at the ways that these behaviors might change as different local governments are encouraged to collaborate. This kind of theoretical model can be paired in the future with actual estimates of local government collaboration and expenditures to help develop efficient, effective, and equitable storm water management policy.